A Philosophical Approach to Questions about Religious Diversity

Abstract and Keywords

The fact of religious diversity provides problems for a variety of approaches to the study of religion. In the philosophical study of religion, there are at least four main areas in which issues are raised by the fact of religious diversity: the epistemology of religious belief, the production of theories of religion, reflection on concepts of God and the Ultimate, and discussion of the relationship between religion and the human good. For the purposes of this article, J. L. Schellenberg's definition of religion in terms of “ultimism” is considered. There are at least four responses to the epistemological problems arising out of religious diversity that are worth discussing: apologetic investment, atheism, agnosticism, and anti-evidentialism. The epistemological reflections on religious diversity are thus vital to the interpretation of religion. There are three main types of theory of religion that arise from or bear upon the fact of religious diversity: naturalism, confessionalism, and pluralism.

Keywords: God, the Ultimate, epistemology, religion, religious belief, human good, naturalism, confessionalism, pluralism, atheism

The fact of religious diversity provides problems for a variety of approaches to the study of religion. In the philosophical study of religion, there are at least four main areas in which issues are raised by the fact of religious diversity: the epistemology of religious belief, the production of theories of religion, reflection on concepts of God and the Ultimate, and discussion of the relationship between religion and the human good.

The Epistemology of Religious Belief


For the purposes of this chapter, I follow J. L. Schellenberg’s definition of religion in terms of “ultimism.” A religion is a set of symbols, beliefs, and practices centered on the affirmation “that there is a reality metaphysically and axiologically ultimate (representing the deepest fact about the nature of things and also unsurpassably great), in relation to which an ultimate good can be attained. Otherwise put, religious claims are those entailing that there is an ultimate and salvific reality” (Schellenberg 2007, 3; see also Byrne 1999).

(p. 30) The fact of religious diversity means that different religions contain competing accounts of the nature of the metaphysically and axiologically ultimate reality and competing accounts of the character of the ultimate good human beings can attain through relation to this reality. Religions are not wholly, or perhaps even primarily, theories, but each contains or implies a theory about the character of the ultimate reality and about the nature of the ultimate good for humans. Even where there is considerable overlap in the accounts of the transcendent, sacred reality and of salvation offered by more than one religion (as with, for example, Christianity and Islam), there will be deep incompatibilities among the theories embedded in them. Moreover, within what we conventionally label as unitary religions, there are similar incompatibilities between one sect’s detailed account of the transcendent, sacred reality and salvation and another’s. Diversity thus throws up “epistemic peer conflict” (Basinger 2002, 1). Religious epistemic peer conflict consists in the fact that different people, by virtue of adhering to different religions or to different forms of the same religion, hold conflicting opinions on important religious questions while being equally sincere and equally knowledgeable about nonreligious matters.

Religious epistemic peer conflict (hereafter “peer conflict” for short) goes deeper than disagreements over questions of truth. Peer conflict over the truth of religious propositions implies, although it does not entail, that there will be conflict about which religious believers have genuine religious experience and which believers are on a genuine path to salvation. These implications—of competition for genuine religious experience and genuine salvific effectiveness—can be avoided only if we can detach success in these two dimensions of religion from the truth of doctrines.

Peer conflict could be denied if it were plausible to assert that we cannot find equally sincere and knowledgeable people in different religions, but this seems a hopeless strategy (but note that reformed epistemology, discussed below, in the end denies the fact of peer conflict). Given peer conflict, then, we have a serious problem about judging which, if any, religion possesses true theories about the Ultimate and which, if any, religious believers have warrant for their beliefs about the Ultimate. By warrant I mean substantive truth-indicative grounds for religious beliefs. Warrant is important because the fact of peer conflict seems too easy to reconcile with the concession that epistemic peers across different religions are all entitled to their religious convictions, where entitlement is a matter of having broken no epistemic obligations in the forming and maintaining of one’s beliefs. In this minimal sense, atheists might indeed concede that many religious believers are entitled to their beliefs even though they are false—just as pre-Copernican astronomers in Europe were entitled to believe that the earth was the stationary center of a concentric universe. But warrant, as defined, is a different matter. If “substantive truth-indicative grounds” means “grounds that make a belief more probable than not,” then it is flatly impossible for two incompatible beliefs to be both warranted.

There are at least four responses to the epistemological problems arising out of religious diversity that are worth discussing: apologetic investment, atheism, agnosticism, and antievidentialism.

(p. 31) Apologetic Investment

Writers such as Griffiths (1991) and Swinburne contend that the appropriate response to peer conflict consists in the search for and presentation of, arguments that will pick out one religion as true over and against the rest. Across seven books, Swinburne presents such a strategy in favor of the truth of Christian theism, that is, for a form of theism that is more than the assertion of the existence of a creator God but includes the fundamental items in the creeds common to Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, and the main Protestant denominations. Swinburne takes the implicit demands of peer conflict seriously. Starting from facts and moral intuitions common to educated people in the contemporary world, he moves to a demonstration of the coherence of a core belief in a personal creator (Swinburne 1993). Next, by reference to such facts and to agreed, accepted standards of inductive arguments (vouched for in the natural sciences), a cumulative, inductive case for the truth of that theism is developed (Swinburne 2004). This cumulative case shows that it is more probable than not that such a God exists. Faith and trust in this God is then shown to be reasonable (Swinburne 2007a). From this minimal theism, four books (Swinburne 1989, 2007b, 1994, 1998) extend the apologetic case to distinctly Christian beliefs. These seven works are backed up by a separate study of the probability of the resurrection of Jesus (Swinburne 2003). By reference to further facts and moral intuitions, these books provide warrant for the account of God, atonement, and providence contained in agreed Christian creeds.

Note what the strategy of apologetic investment implies about peer conflict. Peer conflict exists, but it can be overcome by fuller investigation and reflection. Peers in “other religions” are not stupid or ignorant in general. Once religious peers confront the fact of diversity—and included in that is the fact that some epistemic peers reject religion altogether—they have a duty to engage in the processes of critical rationality that, when conducted correctly, lead to the discovery of apologetic arguments that settle the incompatibilities among religious beliefs in favor of one existing religion.

Atheism

Atheism in this context means more than denial of the existence of a theistic God—in that sense, Buddhists are atheists. I use the term to mean rejection of the indeterminate claim about sacred, transcendent reality within Schellenberg’s definition of religion. Atheists agree with apologetic investors on one main point: diversity entails that religious individuals are under an obligation to reflect critically on their beliefs and come up with substantive, truth-indicative grounds for those beliefs. (Let us call this the apologetic obligation.) If such grounds cannot be produced, upon reflection, then the appropriate conclusion is that there are no such grounds. That means that at best, religious peers are entitled to their religious beliefs, but if they have undergone the reflection and examination demanded by the fact of peer conflict, then they are no longer entitled to them. Atheism affirms that the reasonable (p. 32) conclusion from the failure of apologetic investment is that no religion is true. There is no sacred, transcendent reality.

Atheists affirm that there is no successful apologetic showing one religion to be true and the others false. Leaving aside critiques of particular apologetic strategies, there are general grounds for lack of confidence in apologetic investment. These include the persistence and extent of religious disagreements. If there is an apologetic tiebreaker, why has it not been produced before? The profundity of religious disagreements suggests that there will be problems in appealing to agreed moral intuitions to break the tie: the moral universe of one religious believer might not be that of another. Religious disagreements also involve matters of metaphysics and of ancient history that are notably difficult to resolve intersubjectively.

Agnosticism

One obvious response to persistent peer conflict is that after balancing what can be said for the truth of each religion, there seem to be no strong, truth-indicative grounds for any religious beliefs. The appropriate stance is to remain agnostic about all of them. We can reach this conclusion by going down the same route that took us toward atheism. Agnostics affirm the apologetic obligation. They conclude with atheists that it has not been met and is not likely to be so. Agnostics will deny that this must take us to atheism. They will contend that atheism is bound up in peer conflict as much as any substantive religious position. It, too, must meet the apologetic obligation. According to agnostics, atheists must provide positive, neutrally based proofs of claims of the form “The empirical universe is all there is; no sacred, transcendent reality exists.” Agnostics will claim that proofs of atheism are as hard to come by as proofs of the truth of Buddhism or Judaism. They will thus deny that we can, in the religious case, apply the inference schema “In the absence of cogent evidence for X, it is safe to conclude that there is no X.” In sum, agnostics will deny that there should be a presumption of atheism (contra Flew 2005). An agnostic stance of this kind is worked out in great detail in Schellenberg (2007). It draws on the fact of diversity at a number of points.

Antievidentialism

The key to the response to peer conflict that I call antievidentialism is the denial of the apologetic obligation. According to this approach, religious individuals who are faced with peer conflict arising from religious diversity are under no obligation, after reflecting on their beliefs, to come up with substantive, truth-indicative grounds for those beliefs. Antievidentialism is an appropriate label for this stance insofar as it denies an important implication of the apologetic obligation: that we should search for evidence (of a neutral kind) for religious beliefs. Religious individuals can be aware of peer conflict but remain assured of their particular beliefs in the absence of any attempt, let alone any successful attempt, to secure apologetic evidence for them and against those of their peers.

(p. 33) Antievidentialism is typical of the stance toward religious epistemology and toward the epistemology of religious diversity found in reformed epistemology. A developed example can be found in Plantinga (2000). Central to the Plantinga approach to the epistemic problems created by religious diversity is a denial of two elements bound up with the apologetic imperative urged on us by the likes of Griffiths and Swinburne. These elements are evidentialism and internalism. As applied to religion, evidentialism is the doctrine that the truth-indicative grounds for religious beliefs must include other beliefs that imply them. Religious beliefs cannot be wholly truth-indicatively grounded in the way my belief that there is a goldfinch in my garden is grounded when I just see the goldfinch before me. I need propositional evidence for religious beliefs. Internalism is the doctrine that truth-indicative reasons for beliefs cannot make them truly warranted unless the subject is aware, or could readily be aware, of them. Thus, religious individuals faced with peer conflict have a duty to resort to apologetics. Plantinga denies the application of evidentialism to religious beliefs by claiming that they are, or might be, such that they are grounded nonevidentially, as is my belief regarding the goldfinch. They are, or might be, properly basic, that is, rightly affirmed with confidence even though they are not inferred from other warranted beliefs. In general, he favors an externalist epistemology. According to externalism, beliefs can be warrantedly held if they are the product of cognitive mechanisms that function to produce true beliefs for the most part. Then they are based on truth-indicative grounds, but the subject need not know what these grounds are to hold the beliefs properly.

Plantinga postulates that it is plausible to suppose that Christian beliefs (he is a Christian exclusivist; see below) are the products of cognitive mechanisms of a distinctive sort: a sensus divinitatis and the Internal Instigation of the Holy Spirit (IIHS). The former allows for the proper formation of core theistic beliefs once this “sense of the divine” is appropriately stimulated by, say, awareness of beauty in nature. The latter allows for the proper formation of distinctively Christian beliefs once, say, the words of Christian scripture are read and understood.

Armed with this externalist account of warranted belief, Plantinga contends that religious believers who are aware of the fact of peer conflict can justifiably sit tight and not let diversity produce any diminution of confidence in their beliefs. Plantinga’s externalism entails that the de jure question of the right of believers to hold their beliefs cannot be separated from the de facto question of whether those beliefs might be true (see Plantinga 2000, vi–ix). If standard Christian claims are true, then de facto Christian believers are in a different epistemic position from their apparent epistemic peers in other religions. Even if Christians do not have an evidential case to hand that is superior to that of non-Christian believers, they might well have a functioning sensus divinitatis and IIHS. Thus, if Christian beliefs are true, they might be warranted. This means that Plantinga has the means to hand for turning the force of the fact of peer conflict. It can no longer be shown that believers have no right to be certain of beliefs that are denied by their epistemic peers. A version of one of Plantinga’s own examples shows how this result can be (p. 34) accomplished (see Plantinga 2000, 450–451). I am hauled before the police. They accuse me of committing a crime. All manner of witnesses are produced who saw me at the scene. But I know that at the time of my alleged offense, I was elsewhere. I have a distinct memory of being fifty miles away. Here the fact of peer conflict is very strange, but I could not be wrong over a deliverance of my memory of this clarity. I stick to my belief that I did not commit the crime, not because I have evidence for it or because I can produce evidence that rebuts those who say I did it. I am just confident through memory that I am not the one who committed the crime and that, in some way, these witnesses have it wrong. My simple memory belief means that they are not my epistemic peers after all.

In denying the apologetic obligation, reformed epistemology denies a premise shared by apologetic investment, atheism, and agnosticism. Those three approaches accept that peer conflict means that the surety of religious claims must diminish unless the apologetic obligation can be met. Much depends, then, on the adequacy of the externalist account of warrant that Plantinga brings to bear on the epistemological problems raised by religious diversity.

Theories of Religion


Philosophers, and others, produce theories of religion. Such theories endeavor to plot the place of religion in human life and culture, providing answers to such questions as “What is the meaning of human religiousness?” or “Is religion an enterprise that can be explained in wholly human terms, or is it something that is only comprehensible as the outcome of human interaction with some ultimate reality?” Religious diversity is a very important factor in the formulation and appraisal of theories of religion. This is in large measure because of the interaction between the epistemological issues discussed above and questions about the interpretation and explanation of religion.

How do the epistemology and the interpretation of religion interact? At first glance, it might seem as if they are wholly separate concerns. We might think that the question of whether religious beliefs are true and capable of being warranted is quite distinct from the question of what moves people to embrace them. Questions about the origin and maintenance of religion are different from questions about its truth. Thus, even if it were the case, as many skeptical interpreters of religion contend, that religion is everywhere the product of wish fulfillment and other nonrational factors, it might still be the case that the beliefs of one or more religion were true. A second look, however, will show that epistemological questions and explanatory questions cannot be sharply divorced. While a belief might be true and yet be the outcome of nonrational factors in the minds of those who hold it, further questions must be considered. An important epistemological question concerning religion is “Do/can any religious beliefs amount to knowledge?” It (p. 35) is not sufficient that a belief happens to be true for it to count as knowledge. It must be warranted as well. And that implies something about the belief’s causation. It is so caused that it is no accident that it is true. If a subject’s belief that p amounts to knowledge that p, then this implies something about how the belief that p is generated. Awareness of the fact that p must be a causally necessary condition of the knowing subject’s coming to hold that p. If the dogmas of a particular religion just happened to be true of a sacred, transcendent reality, then those beliefs would not arise from cognitive contact with that reality. That reality’s existence and character could have been quite other than they are, and yet the dogmas would still have the content that they have. But then those dogmas could not count as knowledge. In religions, there is the tacit claim that their beliefs, moral systems, and traditions of spirituality arise out of contact with the Ultimate. This means that they are not wholly human products, for all that they are rooted in human history and culture.

The epistemological reflections on religious diversity are thus vital to the interpretation of religion. There are three main types of theory of religion that arise from or bear upon the fact of religious diversity: naturalism, confessionalism, and pluralism.1

Naturalism

Naturalism is linked to atheism in the epistemology of religious diversity. Atheism is the denial that any sacred, transcendent reality exists. Naturalism in the theory of religion is the name for theories of religion that explain it in wholly human, natural terms. We get from atheism to naturalism in the following way. If atheism is the best bet given diversity, then we must assume that there is no ultimate reality. Causal, cognitive contact with such a reality has not, then, been a moving force in the development of religions. No religious experiences are veridical. Religion is then best seen as wholly naturally caused. Reductive, nonrealist explanations of religion now look plausible. So, diversity gives rise to atheism (as defined earlier in this chapter), and atheism gives rise to naturalism. Moreover, diversity might seem to be best explained by a typical offshoot of atheism: the assertion that religion is everywhere the product of the human imagination fed by desires and needs in the context of different strands of human culture. In contrast, if we supposed that religion, in at least some of its forms, put us in touch with a human-transcending truth, then we would expect that it is not simply the product of the human imagination.

According to the naturalist, a nonrealist interpretation of religion looks likely in the light of diversity. Religions come and go. There is a seemingly endless birth and death of sects in the history of religion. There is no accumulation of reliable belief and no convergence in religion. The overwhelmingly plausible explanation of the manifold forms of human religiousness is the naturalist’s appeal to the imagination and its historical and cultural setting. Religion is not truth-oriented, does not track the truth, and is a fiction.2

(p. 36) Confessionalism

Within each of the main, long-established religions of the world, dogmatic structures have developed to take account of and explain “other religions.” It is possible to interpret religious diversity from the standpoint provided by one of the extant religious confessions. There are thus (varieties of) Christian, Buddhist, Islamic, and other interpretations of the fact that the world contains diverse forms of belief and practice. It is of the essence of a confessionalist interpretation of religion that it is nonegalitarian. For naturalism, in contrast, all religions are works of fiction. The confessionalist is nonegalitarian about the cognitive successes claimed by religions, such as truth, warrant, soteriological effectiveness, veridical religious experiences, and perhaps sound morality. In these things, the confessionalist’s favored religion is superior to “other religions.” The superiority can be a matter of black and white, or it can manifest in shades of gray. For the confessional exclusivist, the successes of the favored religion exclude success in other religions. If the favored religion is true, the others are false. If it offers a means of salvation, the others do not. There is no route to the Ultimate but via the one, true faith.3

However, for the inclusivist, success of the favored religion in some or other of these important dimensions does not altogether exclude success in other religions. Thus, the inclusivist might claim that although the favored religion has the definitive account of truth about the Ultimate and about the human condition, people in other religions have some apprehension of the sacred. This apprehension is not free from error, but it might be enough to allow, for example, adherents of the other religions to act rightly and thus gain salvation. For example, it is common in Orthodox Judaism to contend that while Judaism has the truth about the Almighty, people in other faiths can still be saved. They can be if they know of and adhere to the seven Noachide laws (a set of fundamental socioethical norms). Other religions might be of use and value if they preach the Noachide laws, even though the truth about God is in Judaism.4

In committing themselves to these nonegalitarian perspectives on religion, it is essential for confessionalists to take a particular stand on the epistemological issues raised by religious diversity discussed earlier in this chapter. They must assume that peer conflict does not significantly dent their well-grounded confidence in the truth of their confession’s beliefs. Either the apologetic obligation can be met by, and on behalf of, their confession, or it can be successfully sidestepped (as, for example, per Plantinga).

Pluralism

Pluralism is a return to an egalitarian view of the cognitive successes and failures of human religions. Pluralism can flow from a form of agnosticism. Suppose we accept the validity of the apologetic obligation, judge it not to be met, but conclude that there is enough to be said in favor of the generic belief in a sacred, transcendent reality to avoid atheism.5

(p. 37) Pluralism views all, or at least the major, religions as partial successes or as mitigated failures. It can be summed up in three propositions: (1) All major forms of religion are equal in respect of making common reference to a single, transcendent sacred reality; (2) they are likewise equal in respect of offering some means or other to human salvation; And (3) all religious traditions are to be seen as containing revisable, limited accounts of the nature of the Ultimate; none is certain enough in its specific dogmatic formulations to provide the means of interpreting the others.

Pluralism is a kind of quasi-realist interpretation of religion. Yes, religions are in large measure the product of the human imagination set in unique cultures, but they are not wholly so. There is some accumulation and overlap among them. By far the most widely discussed version of a pluralist theory of religion is that of Hick (2004).

Concepts of Ultimate Reality


Philosophers reflect on and develop conceptions of God, or the Ultimate. The fact of religious diversity provides a particular input to such reflection and development. It does so more especially for those who respond to diversity in a pluralist or inclusivist spirit. Thinkers in both of these camps will maintain that believers in many different faiths succeed in establishing cognitive contact with the sacred, transcendent reality postulated by religion. The contact will be in one or more of these dimensions: experience of the divine; descriptions of the divine that have some verisimilitude; ethical and religious practices that provide right orientation toward the divine; worship, contemplation, or prayer that contains a successful reference to the divine. The general problem that this claim to panreligious success raises can be stated thus: How can such success be possible given that there are deep incompatibilities among (and within) religions on the matter of what the Ultimate is like? Crudely, we can ask, how can incompatible accounts of the Ultimate all have some measure of truth when they contradict one another?

Hick’s version of pluralism produces a radical, and much debated, solution to the above nest of problems. He distinguishes between the Ultimate (which he calls “the Real”) as it is in itself and as it appears to human beings through the lens of the particular religious traditions to which human beings belong. The distinction recalls Kant’s distinction between the world as it is in itself and as it appears to human beings. Hick’s distinction is based on the Kantian thought that human modes of cognition (in this instance, the conceptual structure supplied by a religious tradition) shape our awareness of reality. Since we cannot but cognize the Ultimate via the concepts furnished by a given human tradition, we cannot have an unmediated apprehension of it. Hick calls this postulate of a distinction between the Ultimate in itself and as it appears to us “the Pluralist Hypothesis” (see Hick (p. 38) 2004, chaps. 14–15). With it there goes a reinterpretation of truth in religion. At one level, different religions have pictures of the divine that are true of different manifestations of the Real, for there are many ways in which the Real appears to human beings in history, and the different religions contain true accounts of those different phenomenal manifestations. At another level, different religions contain metaphorically true accounts of the Ultimate as it is in itself, and for that metaphorical truth, incompatibilities among their accounts literally interpreted do not matter. This is because metaphorical truth in this context is, for Hick, a form of pragmatic truth. A religion is true of the Real in itself insofar as its concepts and practices provide a successful way of orienting its followers in behavior; that is, it puts believers on a path toward genuine moral and spiritual transformation. Hick calls this theory of religious language and truth a “mythological” reading of them (Hick 2004, chap. 19).

There are other paths that pluralists who are not impressed by Hick’s mythological theory can tread. A less radical move than Hick’s “appearance versus reality in itself” distinction consists in viewing the divine as similar to a natural kind. A natural kind, such as water, has a real essence (its molecular structure) that is invariant, but it manifests different, and incompatible, sensible qualities in different environments. In one set of circumstances, it is a solid (ice); in another, it is a liquid (normal water); and in a third, it is a gas (water vapor). In a corresponding fashion, the Ultimate might be one while manifesting itself to human beings now as personal God or now as an impersonal absolute. This is the notion that the one transcendent, sacred reality is one but has many aspects. Different religions provide pictures of different aspects. This multiaspectual view of the Ultimate is explored by Byrne (1995), McKim (1988), and Ward (1987).

The reflections on the nature of the Ultimate summarized thus far best fit pluralist responses to diversity, for they entail that the accounts of the Ultimate in existing religions are quite radically incomplete or limited. Confessional inclusivists need not go so far. One way of securing the aims of inclusivism in the face of the fact that the other religions contain accounts of the divine that seriously conflict with that found in the favored confession consists in separating reference from truth. What matters to the inclusivist may be that the faithful in other religions use concepts and symbols that refer to the divine. By this means, they can be said to worship it and pray to it and perhaps experience it (although the experiences are not wholly veridical). It is possible to argue that in many nonreligious cases, successful reference can be made to an entity through false descriptions. Reference can be established through contextual factors in the absence of descriptive adequacy. This point can then be applied to the religious case. Thus, it is possible for the Christian inclusivist to conclude that the faithful Muslim refers to the one true God in his or her prayers and worship, although his or her account of that being’s nature contains many errors, judged from the Christian standpoint.6 This is another method whereby descriptive adequacy and truth in the theologies of the different religions can be downplayed in order to maintain some convergence among faiths despite theoretical conflicts among them.

(p. 39) Religion and the Human Good


In the pursuit of affirming convergence among faiths despite theoretical conflicts among them, both inclusivists and pluralists will typically maintain that people in different religions can be on a path to salvation/liberation. Once this last commitment is made, it almost inevitably brings with it another one: the claim that there is a wide measure of agreement on matters of moral good and right across the major religions. This alleged moral consensus is something that allows for the affirmation of a degree of convergence among the religions despite the many things that divide them. Hick affirms the moral convergence of the faiths as part of his pluralism, telling us that there is a range of moral values that all of the major religions agree on (Hick 2004, chap. 18). They agree that a life of generous goodwill, love, and compassion is the constitutive means of attaining both the human good and a life lived in authentic relation to the Ultimate.7

Although this commitment to moral convergence beneath doctrinal differences is widespread among pluralist and inclusivist interpreters of religion, it is not without its critics. D’Costa is one who has argued that the commitment is based on a superficial reading of the moral teachings of the great world religions (see D’Costa 1993). The commitment fails to appreciate that it is only when viewed at a misleading level of generality that the moral values of the different religions can be seen as the same. To illustrate, while we might say that both Christianity and Theravada Buddhism are committed to a life of self-renunciation as the best and the most liberating, on close examination, we find divergence. For the Christian, the life of self-renunciation is one of loving God through loving the other self that is one’s neighbor, while for the Buddhist, self-renunciation is a matter of seeing through the illusion behind the “fact” of enduring, separate selves (see D’Costa 1993, 94).

The difference of opinion noted above is part and parcel of a larger debate in ethical theory between what might be called universalists and particularists. The former affirm that there are substantive moral values (rules and principles) that transcend different moral traditions; there is a common moral sense among humankind. The latter insist that moral values are constituted in their definite meaning only against the backdrop of tradition-bound forms of awareness and thought. The writings of Alasdair McIntyre have been influential in shaping such particularism.8

However we judge the truth between universalists and particularists, it is evident that moral universalism is an important component of a typical pluralist and inclusivist outlook. Without it, it is very hard to see convergence within the diversity of faiths.

References

Alston, William. 1989. “Referring to God.” In Divine Nature and Human Language. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 103–117.
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Basinger, David. 2002. Religious Diversity: A Philosophical Assessment. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate.
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Byrne, Peter. 1995. Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism. Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan.
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Byrne, Peter. 1999. “The Definition of Religion: Squaring the Circle.” In J. Platvoet and A. Molendijk, eds., The Pragmatics of Defining Religion. Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 379–396.
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Craig, William. 1989. “‘No Other Name”: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ.” Faith and Philosophy 6: 172–188.
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D’Costa, Gavin. 1993. “Whose Objectivity? Which Neutrality? The Doomed Quest for a Neutral Vantage Point from Which to Judge Religions.” Religious Studies 29: 79–95.
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Flew, Anthony. 2005. God and Philosophy. New York: Prometheus.
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Griffiths, Paul. 1991. An Apology for Apologetics. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis.
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Hick, John. 2004. An Interpretation of Religion, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave.
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Kent, Bonnie. 1994. “Moral Provincialism.” Religious Studies 30: 269–285.
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MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1988. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
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McKim, Robert. 1988. “Could God Have More than One Nature?” Faith and Philosophy 5: 378–398.
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Miller, Richard 1986. “The Reference of ‘God.’” Faith and Philosophy 3: 3–15.
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Plantinga, Alvin. 2000. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Solomon, Norman. 1993. “Is the Plurality of Faiths Problematic?” In A. Sharma, ed., God, Truth and Reality. Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 189–199.
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Swinburne, Richard. 1989. Responsibility and Atonement. Oxford: Clarendon.
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Swinburne, Richard. 1998. Providence and the Problem of Evil. Oxford: Clarendon.
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Swinburne, Richard. 2003. The Resurrection of God Incarnate. Oxford: Clarendon.
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Swinburne, Richard. 2004. The Existence of God, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon.
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Swinburne, Richard. 2007a. Faith and Reason, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon.
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Swinburne, Richard. 2007b. Revelation, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon.
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Twiss, Sumner. 1990. “The Philosophy of Religious Pluralism: A Critical Appraisal of John Hick and His Critics.” Journal of Religion 70: 533–568.
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(p. 41) Ward, Keith. 1987. Images of Eternity. London: Darton, Longman and Todd.
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Zamulinski, Brian. 2003. “Religion and the Pursuit of Truth.” Religious Studies 39: 43–60.
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For Further Reading

DiNoia, Joseph. 1992. The Diversity of Religions. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press of America.
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Gellman, Jerome. 2000. “In Defence of a Contented Religious Exclusivism.” Religious Studies 36: 401–417.
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Kraft, James. 2007. “Religious Disagreement, Externalism and the Epistemology of Disagreement: Listening to Our Grandmothers.” Religious Studies 43: 417–432.
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McKim, Robert. 2001. Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Netland, Harold. 1991. Dissonant Voices. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans.
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Quinn, Phillip. 1995. “Toward Thinner Theologies: Hick and Alston on Religious Diversity.” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 38: 145–164.
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Quinn, Phillip, and Kevin Meeker, eds. 2000. The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Runzo, Joseph. 1993. World Views and Perceiving God. Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan.
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Notes:

(1.) For a fuller and more detailed list, see Byrne 1995, 2–16.

(2.) For a contemporary defense of these assertions, see Zamulinski 2003.

(3.) See Craig 1989 for a contemporary Christian form of exclusivism.

(4.) See Solomon 1993.

(5.) What might be said in favor of this generic belief is John Hick’s argument that moral transformation in the major world faiths is evidence of human interaction with ultimate reality; for Hick’s epistemic strategy, see the overview in Twiss 1990.

(6.) See Alston 1989 and Miller 1986 for versions of this theory.

(7.) Compare Solomon’s Jewish inclusivism, described above.

(8.) See McIntyre 1988; surveys of aspects of the debate can be found in Kent 1994 and Byrne 1995, 103–105.

Peter Byrne
Peter Byrne is Professor of Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion at King’s College, London.